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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE

DISTRICT COURT
The caption of the case contains the names of all
parties to the proceedings in the District Court.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction is based on §78-2a-3 (2) (k), U.C.A. (1953).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether plaintiff, a trust beneficiary, has

established hostility between the trustee and her to give her
standing to sue.
2.

Whether plaintiff established an exception to the

bar of limitations that would otherwise apply if the claims were
brought by the trustee.
3.

Whether defendants breached any duty by executing

the trustee's written direction to make the account transfers and
whether plaintiff established defendants had "actual knowledge"
under Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 75-7-406 that the trustee's
directions breached the Trust, if they did.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Each of the issues presented for review was determined
by summary judgment.

The standard of review is for correctness.

Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

STATUTES AND RULES QF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Those statutes and rules which are of importance to the
appeal are set forth in the Addendum.
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NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff is a beneficiary of her husband Norman's
trust.

Her only child, James, is its trustee.

She sues the

trustee's stockbroker, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. and its account
executive, Ralph Pahnke, for executing in 1980 the trustee's
written instructions to transfer the Trust assets to the
trustee's personal account and to plaintiff's trust account.

She

has not sued the trustee.
A Utah statute provides that, absent contrary "actual
knowledge," a third party has no duty to probe whether the
trustee is properly exercising trust powers.

Defendants did not

have "actual knowledge" the 1980 transfers breached the Trust, if
they did.

Failing to show "actual knowledge," plaintiff contends

that because, when the Trust brokerage account was opened in
1978, clerks examined the Trust Agreement to see who the trustee
was and that he could deal in securities, defendants had actual
knowledge the 1980 transfers breached the Trust's distribution
provisions.
Plaintiff believed from the outset that the Trust
assets were her untouchable nest egg.

In 1984, the trustee told

her that he had borrowed against and had lost all the assets on

C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA

2

margin call.

The news devastated her but she did nothing and

waited more than six years to sue.
CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES
The complaint alleges four claims: (1) breach of
contract; (2) tortious interference with contract; (3) breach of
fiduciary duty; and, (4) negligence.

Plaintiff seeks damages

equal to the value of the stock sold to pay her son's loans.
Defendants contend that undisputed facts of record
show: (1) plaintiff lacks standing to sue; (2) all four claims
would be barred by statutes of limitations against the trustee
and no exception to the bar exists for plaintiff; and (3)
defendants did not have actual knowledge of the trustee's alleged
breach of trust, so their duty was to execute precisely the
trustee's instructions to transfer the assets.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
In 1991, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
because plaintiff lacked standing.
motion.

The trial court granted the

An amended complaint replaced Anna Lee as the

named-plaintiff with a trustee, David M. Dudley.

The trial court

dismissed the amended complaint on grounds that his claims were
time-barred.

Anna Lee appealed.

This Court reversed and

remanded, holding "it is clear from the complaint the beneficiary
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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c o u l d p r o v e f a c t s showing s h e h a s s t a n d i n g
Dean W i t t e r R e y n o l d s .
cert,

denied.

i s s u e of

Inc..

. . . ."

Anderson v.

841 P . 2 d 742, 745 (Utah App.

853 P . 2 d 897 ( 1 9 9 3 ) .

1992),

The C o u r t d i d n o t r e a c h

limitations.1
Plaintiff

p r o c e e d e d on t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t .

p a r t i e s completed e x t e n s i v e discovery.
certificate
judgment.

of r e a d i n e s s f o r t r i a l
(R. 9 2 8 - 9 . )

summary j u d g m e n t .
plaintiff's

Plaintiff

(R. 1 2 7 9 - 8 0 . )

filed

The
a

(R. 812) and moved f o r

T h r e e weeks l a t e r ,

summary

d e f e n d a n t s moved

The t r i a l c o u r t

and g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t s '

entry explaining i t s ruling

motion,

for

denied

entered a minute

(R. 1641-2) and e n t e r e d on J u l y 1 1 ,

1994 a f i n a l Amended O r d e r and Judgment Nunc P r o Tunc a s of
7, 1994

the

(R. 1 7 1 7 - 9 ) , from which p l a i n t i f f

June

appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
D e f e n d a n t s do n o t d i s p u t e p l a i n t i f f ' s

S t a t e m e n t of

Facts to the extent i t accurately s t a t e s the record,
important uncontradicted f a c t s .

D e f e n d a n t s make t h i s

but i t

omits

Statement

of F a c t s f o r a c c u r a c y and c o m p l e t e n e s s .

1

"[The motion t o dismiss the amended complaint] claimed a s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s b a r . Although Anna Lee Anderson a l s o appealed t h e d i s m i s s a l of
t h e 'Amended Complaint,' we need not reach t h a t i s s u e because we a r e r e v e r s i n g
t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e o r i g i n a l complaint." I d . a t 744, n. 1.
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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Creation of Norman Trust.
1.

Norman Anderson's Trust Agreement, Anna Lee

Anderson's Trust Agreement and their two wills were prepared by
attorney Ronny Cutshall.

On November 17, 1978, he mailed them to

plaintiff and Norman with a detailed, letter describing their
operation.

Mr. Cutshall does not remember any conversations with

the Andersons.
2.

(R. 1861, 2001-4.)
Plaintiff and James discussed Norman's Trust when

they reviewed Mr. Cutshall's letter.
instruments provided.

She understood what the

She was concerned where Norman's assets

would go on his death but, on reading Mr. Cutshall's letter and
discussing it with James, she saw it was "taken care of." (R.
1826-8.)
3.

Plaintiff knew James was Norman's and her trustee.

James had graduated from college and plaintiff believed he ought
to know what to do in handling trusts, and she trusted his
business acumen.

(R. 1826).

She kept in her home copies of both

wills and both trust agreements to look at whenever she wanted.
(R. 1830:15-20.)
4.

Norman's Trust Agreement was signed November 20,

and plaintiff's on November 28, 1978.

C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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Opening of Brokerage Account for Norman Trust.
5.

On November 20, 1978, James, as trustee, opened a

stock trading account for the Norman Trust with the Salt Lake
City office of Dean Witter.

Ralph Pahnke was the account

executive for Dean Witter who assisted2 him.

(R. 2118:15-18.)

An account executive only gathers documents and forwards them on
for administrative processing; the account executive cannot
approve the opening of a new account.
6.

(R. 2150:6-21.)

When the account was opened, James did not request

nor did Pahnke agree that Dean Witter would undertake to
supervise the Trust or the trustee.
not remember any such discussion.
7.

(R. 2252, % 5.)

James does

(R. 1878:3-6.)

When a new account was opened by a trustee for a

trust, Dean Witterfs standard procedure was to request from the
trustee a complete copy of the trust instrument and to send it to
its San Francisco, California, Regional Operations Service
Center, Office of Name and Address Control, Trust Desk, of which
Kathy Barnett was supervisor in late 1978.

2

(R. 2244, 1 7.)

The record does not show Pahnke was "engaged to manage" the account,
as plaintiffs' Brief (at 7, 1 3) claims his deposition (R. 2118) shows.
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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8.

James delivered a copy of Norman's Trust Agreement

to Ralph Pahnke.

Ralph Pahnke looked at parts of only the first

and the last pages of the document to determine the name and date
of the Trust and the identity of the trustee and to verify his
signature.

He did not then or ever read more of it; he had no

reason to do so.
9.

He did not keep a copy of it. (R. 2119-21.)

Ms. Barnett reviewed 50 to 100 trust instruments

each day from 30 to 40 branch offices in several western states.
She has no independent recollection of her review of Norman's
Trust Agreement.
10.

(R. 1969-70, 1972.)

In monitoring names and addresses for new

accounts, it was Ms. Barnett's function, and the policy of
the Trust Desk, to determine from a trust instrument:

(a) the

name of the trust; (b) its date; (c) the name and signature of
the trustee; (d) the trustee's power to trade securities; (e) the
provisions for amending the trust; and (f) the procedure for
replacing a resigning trustee.
1977:12-25; 1981:14-25.)

C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA

(R. 2245, % 9; 1972:17-22;

The Trust Desk did not approve nor

7

undertake 3 t o approve or disapprove of t h e t r u s t e e ' s

distribution

p r o p o s a l s . 4 (R. 2246, W 12-14.)
11.

Ms. B a r n e t t looked for t h e d e t a i l needed t o open

t h e t r u s t account by scanning t h e paragraph headings i n t h e
i n s t r u m e n t , s t o p p i n g t o read only when t h e heading s u g g e s t e d
(R. 1980-1.)

She would not read t h e e n t i r e t r u s t

because t h e r e was no reason t o do s o .
12.

it.

instrument

(R. 2245, 1 10.)

On November 29, 1978, Ms. B a r n e t t s e n t a wire t o

t h e S a l t Lake C i t y o f f i c e v e r i f y i n g t h e Norman Anderson T r u s t
account name and approving i t for cash only t r a d i n g .
1 1 1 ; R. 2250.)

(R. 2245-6,

Margin t r a d i n g had not been r e q u e s t e d .

(R. 1990.)

Death of Norman and Probate.
13.

Norman Anderson died March 9, 1979.

(R. 1870.)

A t t o r n e y Dean Gray p r o b a t e d the e s t a t e i n 1979 and 1980. He could

3

Although i t was s t a n d a r d procedure t o r e q u e s t a complete copy of a
t r u s t i n s t r u m e n t , i f a t r u s t e e o b j e c t e d t o producing the e n t i r e i n s t r u m e n t , i t
was e s t a b l i s h e d procedure for Dean W i t t e r t o accept a " p a r t i a l t r u s t , "
c o n s i s t i n g of t h e f i r s t and l a s t pages and those pages d e a l i n g with s e c u r i t i e s
t r a d i n g a u t h o r i t y , t r u s t amendment and t r u s t e e r e s i g n a t i o n .
(R. 2222:28-30).
I t was a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y e a s i e r t o ask for a complete copy, r a t h e r than e x p l a i n
which p a r t i c u l a r pages were needed: "Unless we got a complete copy, o f t e n as
not we would not g e t t h e n e c e s s a r y p a g e s . " (R. 2209:1-7, 2 2 1 0 : 6 - 1 1 ) .
4

A l l e n Rockier, an i n d u s t r y e x p e r t , t e s t i f i e d s t a n d a r d i n d u s t r y
procedure on opening accounts i s t o see who t h e t r u s t e e i s , t h a t he i s
a u t h o r i z e d t o deal i n s e c u r i t i e s and the name of t h e t r u s t ; "Firms did not
c a r e about a t a l l - - none of them cared about what the d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o v i s i o n s
were in a t r u s t . "
(R. 2142.)
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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not recall any of his conversations with James, and his file has
been destroyed.

(R. 2206.)

Typically, he would review with a

personal representative the distribution provisions of an
applicable trust.
14.

(R. 2207-8.)

Plaintiff understood Norman left at his death

in his Trust account several million dollars worth of stock of
Levi Strauss & Company.

She never asked James what he was going

to do with the stock or about distributing the estate.

(R. 1835).

Letter of Authorization
15.

On April 22, 1980, James went to see Pahnke.

He

said it was time to distribute the stock from his father's Trust.
Pahnke asked him, "What would you like to take place?"

James

directed that 24,118 shares of Levi stock be transferred from the
Norman Trust account to the Family Trust. James said he was the
beneficiary of the Family Trust and, therefore, the stock should
go to his existing personal margin account at Dean Witter.

He

told Pahnke that all of the remaining stock should go to the
Marital Trust.

He said his mother was the beneficiary of the

Marital Trust, and, therefore, the stock should go into the
existing margin account maintained for the Anna Lee Trust.
2253 1 10; 2124-7; 2128-31.)

Pahnke told James that Dean Witter

required a letter of authorization to transfer or "journal"
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA

(R.

"

securities from one account to another.

James dictated the

letter of authorization to Mr. Pahnke at his desk, stating the
detail of the transfers.

Pahnke wrote James' instructions in his

own handwriting, supplying technical words like "journaled" and
"Type 1 account."

The letter directed the transfer of 24,118

Levi shares "to the Family Trust which is James Norman Anderson
acct. no. 124-21818-1" -- i.e.f James1 existing, personal margin
account. The letter further directed the remaining shares "should
be distributed to the Marital Trust 124-25481-1-47" -- i.e.. the
existing margin account for the Anna Lee Trust.

James read it

and signed it, "James Norman Anderson, trustee for the family
trust and personal representative."
the branch cashier.

Pahnke gave the letter to

He does not know what happens to such

letters of authorization after they go to the cashier.
2128:16-22.)

(R.

Pahnke had no reason to discuss with James whether

the instructions were authorized by the Trust document and did
not discuss that with him.

He knew James had both an accountant

and a lawyer assisting him on Trust matters. He had no knowledge
whatever the distributions were improper, if they were, and he
merely followed James' directions.

C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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(R. 2254, 1 12.)

16.

James did not deny or refute Pahnke's testimony.

James testified that he cannot recall5 what happened in their
meeting: "I can't remember [what was said]. I just know the
reason why, and this letter (of April 22, 1980) evidently allowed
that to happen."

(R. 1894-5, 1899, 1910-12.)

Q: "Could it be that you told Ralph how many
shares to put in one account and how many shares to put
in the other account and don't remember it now?
A.
(R. 1905:15-18).

We could have talked about that."
He does not remember whether he asked if Pahnke

had read the Norman Trust Agreement or if he had a copy of it.
(R. 1908, 1913, 1928:11-22.)
authorizing the transfers.

James read and signed the letter
(R. 1901:13-25.)

James1 Affidavit

says he "never questioned the propriety of the transfers" and was
"entirely unaware the transfers violated the specific terms of
the Norman Anderson Trust."
17.

(R. 223 9.)

Dean Witter does not now have the working

documents to show how the 1980 transfer transactions were handled
or approved internally.

(R. 1805.)

Typical procedure, however,

was that a letter of authorization would be forwarded by the
branch cashier to one of forty to fifty credit (i.e.. margin)
5

Review of James' deposition (R. 1893-1913) shows James has virtually
no memory of what was said and done on this occasion, other than that he
signed the letter of April 22, 1980.
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clerks in the San Francisco Regional Operations for review to see
that the assets designated were available and to process the
transfers.

(R. 2207-8, 2221:14-16.)
18.

When a trustee directs that trust assets be

distributed, Dean Witter performs no review.

Greg Taylor,

Witter's Regional Compliance Officer, testified:
And the trustee will tell us where to journal assets.
And we are not going to challenge the trustee as to
whether or not the account receiving those assets is a
beneficiary. That's the trustee's responsibility to
determine who the beneficiaries are, not Dean Witter.
(R. 2216:12-17.)
authorization.

It obtains from the trustee a written letter of
If the trustee directs the transfer to existing

accounts of beneficiaries, no additional steps are taken.

(R.

2224:5-14.)
19.

Expert Allen Rockier testified that the industry

practice is for the broker to take the instructions from the
trustee and to follow the instructions "to the letter without
interrogation; we do not have any choice in that."

(R. 2144-5.)

Expert Edward D. Spurgeon, Dean of the University of Georgia Law
School, experienced with trusts and stockbrokers, testified that
it is not the practice of brokerages to inquire into a trustee's
power to make distribution of trust assets.
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(R. 14:7-11.)

Account Activity.
20.

Over the next four years, James borrowed against

the stock in the Anna Lee Trust and his personal accounts. The
Levi stock had a low tax basis; margin borrowing allowed him to
receive cash without selling the stock.

(R. 2279-80.)

James

told his mother he had borrowed from her trust, margining the
stock.

Plaintiff herself regularly borrowed money from her trust

account for routine living expenses, and she approved of James1
borrowing money from it "whenever he needed it."
1856:10-12; 2284-6; 2289-94.)
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(R. 1839:14-25;

21.

Every month James received statements for the

three Dean Witter accounts.

He read them; he filed them at home.

They showed all the transfers and margin activity in the
accounts.

(R. 1784-1812.)
22.

On May 16, 1980, James consulted with two tax

advisers, Kent Demars and Stuart T. Matheson, an attorney,
regarding estate planning.

Matheson's notes show James requested

a "detailed analysis" (R. 2050, 2086) and received a seven-page
legal opinion analyzing Norman's Trust Agreement and opining that
James had the exclusive right to direct the distribution of
principal and income from the Family Trust, and therefore its
assets were excluded from Anna Lee's personal estate.
8:49-56.)

(R. 2042-

Matheson kept a copy of Norman's Trust Agreement.

(R.

2026.)
23.

On May 28, 1980, James met with Matheson and

discussed the Norman Anderson Marital and Family Trusts in
connection with James1 closing of a purchase of a new $490,000
home.

They decided to place the title to the home 70% in the

name of James Anderson as Trustee of the Anna Lee Anderson Trust
and 3 0% in the name of James Anderson as Trustee of the James
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Anderson Trust.

The file contained a memo showing they discussed

the need to "[w]ork up a game plan for . . . Goal: transfer
$400,000 - from Anna Lee to Jim."
24.

(R. 2058, 2087.)

The next day, May 29, 1980, James borrowed

$250,000 on the Anna Lee Trust account (R. 1808) and $123,549.82
on his account.

(R. 1812).

He used the money to purchase the

home, placing the title in the 70%/30% split discussed with
Matheson.

(R. 1935.)

Thereafter, James borrowed an additional

$446,674.31 from the accounts for improvements on the home.
(R. 1940-5.)
25.

On September 30, 1980, James' accountant, Teresa

Scott, sent to him two completed "Form 1041, U.S. Fiduciary
Income Tax Return" forms for 1979:

one for the "Norman Anderson

Family Trust" (R. 1946-50) and one for the "Norman Anderson
Marital Trust."

(R. 1950-6.)

She apportioned the dividends on

the Levi stock between the Marital and Family Trust returns.

She

testified her procedure would have been to review and outline the
Norman Trust Agreement, but could not remember doing it and her
files were destroyed.
26.

(R. 2156-8.)

On April 9, 1981, James met for an hour and one-

half with Matheson and Kent DeMars.

Mr. Matheson's note to the

file states: "Jim and Kent will provide me with all of the
accounting documentation regarding the source of funds both going
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into Anna Lee and Jim's trust (in the estate of Norman Anderson)
together with ledger accounting materials from the trust or
trusts to Jim and/or Development Company." (R. 2083.)

His

handwritten note shows James received "21,000 shares of Levi from
inheritances - Family Trust."

(R. 2081, 2036.)

Neither James

nor Matheson can remember any of the conversations they had about
Matheson's legal work in 1980 and 1981. Mr. Matheson's
notes do not refer to any impropriety about the asset transfers
from Norman's Trust to James' and Anna Lee's trust accounts.

(R.

2028:17; 2030:9; 2035:12-25.)

In 1984, James Told Plaintiff of the Loss of All the Levi Stock.
25.

James told plaintiff in 1984 that all Levi stock

in both accounts had been sold to repay the margin borrowing.
(R. 1845-7; 1857:4-10.)

She testified:

Q. In late May 1984 and the first week of June of
1984 all the Levi stock was sold to pay the bill in
both your trust account and the stock that was in Jim's
name, too. Jim talked to you about that in 1984?
A. Sure.
Q. Tell me as closely as you can recall the
substance of what Jim said and what you said in that
conversation?
A. He told me what you just said.
Q. What?
A. That the stock had to be sold to cover our
debt.
(R. 1845-6.)
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26.

Plaintiff could not understand "where all that

money disappeared to;" she felt "broke," "devastated";
"dumbfounded," "speechless," "sad."
state of shock"; "heartsick.

It was "overwhelming", "a

Try it sometime."

(R. 1846:7-9;

1847:1-4; 1848:8; 184 9:15.)
27.

She believed the Levi stock in the Norman Trust

was in her words, "untouchable."

(R. 1856:8-9.)

She testified:

Q. All right, when Norman's estate was being
probated [in 1979] by Dean Gray, you received notices
from the court that he [James] had applied to the court
through Dean Gray to have the estate probated, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Norman had died and you understood that he had
Levi stock that was worth, say, a couple million
dollars, right?
A. Right.
Q. You understood that Jim was the trustee for
that stock?
A. Yes.
Q. So you understood whatever was to be done with
Norman's assets Jim was to do it?
A. No. He wasn't to mess around with anything.
That was a separate account.
Q. Who did you think was to manage Norman's
estate?
A. I don't know. It wasn't to be monkeyed with. It
was a trust. A separate affair.
Q. But you didn't ask him any questions about it
until we got to the arbitration in 1990?
A. He didn't know either.
Q. Well, did you ask Jim any questions about it
until you got to the arbitration in 1990?
A. What was there to ask?
Q. Either you did or you didn't.
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A. I didn't.
Q. Okay. Now, why didn't you ask Jim anything
about what was going to be done with Norman's assets?
A. I don't remember. They were fine where they
were.
Q. Did you talk to him about that?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever tell him to leave the assets right
where they were?
A. No.
Q. You just didn't discuss the subject at all,
right?
A. They weren't available to Jim or me.
A. That was my nest egg. That should have been
left alone.
Q. Well, when he told you in June of 1984, he told
you that all the stock was gone, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you then understand that all the money in
both the marital trust and the family trust was gone -I mean all the stock was gone?
A. Yes.
(R. 1834:19-23; 1835:7-20; 1836:21-4; 1837:1-25; 1838:1-3;
1851:8-9; 1857:4-10.)
28.

Despite 1984's "devastating" news that her

"untouchable nest egg" now was gone, Anna Lee did nothing.

She

did not talk with Ken Hanni, the attorney who had handled Anna
Lee's and Norman's estate planning from 1971 through 1976.

She

did not talk to Bill Anderson, who had been the family accountant
since the 60'S.

She did not talk to Ronnie Cutshall, the

attorney who had prepared the Norman Trust and written to her
about it.

She did not talk to Dean Gray, the attorney who had
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probated Norman's estate.

(R. 1847:8-25.)

And, she did not talk

to Ralph Pahnke, or to Dean Witter!s branch manager, or to any
other Dean Witter representative about the loss.

(R. 1848-9.)

She told no one:
Q.
A.
Q.
why you
A.

Did you talk to anybody about it?
No.
Just kept it to yourself. Is there any reason
didn't talk to anybody about it? . . .
There's no reason.

(R. 1849:4-7, 21.)
A. I had no idea and I didn't ask. I cared, but
caring and asking and knowing are something I should
have been better at.
(R. 1859:1-3.)
29.

James did not try to dissuade her from making an

inquiry or contacting the professionals.
never hid anything from his mother.

(R. 1850:3-5.)

(R. 1929-30.)

James

Anna Lee did

not then, and has not since, made any claim against her son, whom
she believes did nothing wrong:
Q.
was all
A.
Q.
wrong?
A.

Did he tell you whether or not he thought it
right to take the money?
No, he didn't say that.
Did he tell you that he thought he knew it was
He didn't know it was wrong.

(R. 1852:9-14; 1853:l-2.)

C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA

19

It was there.

Arbitration Proceedings30.

James and the Anna Lee Anderson Trust, through

their present attorney, James E. Morton, filed suit in May 1987
in federal court (James N. Anderson and the Anna Lee Anderson
Trust v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.: Case No. 87C-483A).
parties stipulated to arbitration.

The

Plaintiff's affidavit

volunteered that she "initiate[d] the federal lawsuit and
ultimate arbitration proceeding."
31.

Arbitration hearings were conducted in December,

1990 and in March, 1991.
32.

(R. 2235, 1 7, 14.)

(R. 0236.)

At the outset of the arbitration hearing on

December 4, 1990 (R. 2259), the claimants commenced questioning
about a new claim of improper transfers made by the April 1980
letter of authorization.6

The arbitration panel found James'

attempt to raise the improper transfer issue to be untimely,
stating:

[W]e're not going to allow i t [the l e t t e r of
authorization] to be introduced for the purposes of
r a i s i n g a new claim at t h i s time. I don't think a new
claim i s timely made or proper at t h i s time so the new
claim t h a t you were describing to us we w i l l not be
entertained.

6

A year a f t e r James had closed the Dean W i t t e r a c c o u n t s , he o b t a i n e d
from Dean W i t t e r i n September 1986 copies of documents which h i s lawyer t o l d
t h e a r b i t r a t i o n panel included a copy of t h e A p r i l 22, 1980 l e t t e r of
authorization.
(R. 1925:7-11; 2266:15-25.)
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We believe your client had enough information that
had he told you, you could have raised these claims
earlier and didn't do so.
(R. 2275:19-23, 2276:6-9.)

This complaint by Anna Lee was filed

on December 6, 1990 (R. 1-12.)

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS
The crux of this action is the 1980 transfer of stock
from the Norman Anderson Trust account to the Anna Lee Anderson
Trust account and to James Anderson's personal account.
Plaintiff's Brief (at 25) admits this case "turns on the
propriety of [that] single isolated transaction."

She claims the

assets should not have been transferred from Norman's Trust
account.

(R. 1856:8-9.)
Ralph Pahnke's role was to relay the letter of

authorization to the branch cashier who sent it to the regional
margin department, whose sole role was to execute the written
instructions signed by the customer.

(Facts %% 17-19.)

Dean

Witter correctly performed its duty to follow the customer's
instructions.

It transferred the assets to the accounts James

intended to designate.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to
defendants on three grounds.

First, plaintiff lacks standing to

sue to recover the trust assets.
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA

^ *

Trusts operate through

trustees, not beneficiaries, and trustees' acts and omissions
bind trusts; a beneficiary cannot sue on behalf of the trust
unless there is demonstrated hostility with the trustee.
Plaintiff has not shown, and the record disproves, requisite
hostility between James and Anna Lee.
Second, plaintiff's complaint is barred by limitations.
The transfer claim arose in 1980; suit was not filed until 1990.
The trustee is barred, and so is the beneficiary.

There is no

factual basis in the record to apply the exception permitting a
beneficiary to sue a third party when the trustee and the third
party knowingly participate in breaching the trust. Furthermore,
plaintiff is barred by laches from pursuing her claim because she
waited more than six years, while records were destroyed and
witnesses' memories faded, to sue for a loss she admittedly knew
in 1984 should not have occurred.
Third, plaintiff's claims fail on the merits.

She does

not pursue on appeal claims for breach of contract or tortious
interference with contract.

She has not shown any promise was

made to her or to the trustee by defendants or by third parties
which defendants breached or with which they interfered.
Her negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims fail
because she produced no witness to establish any industry
22
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standard of practice, nor to show defendants breached anystandard; defendants showed no standard was breached.

These

claims also require a finding that defendants breached a legal
duty by executing James1 instructions to transfer the Norman
Trust assets.
law.

In fact, no such duty was breached as a matter of

Under the Utah Uniform Trustee's Powers Act, absent "actual

knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them," defendants may "assume without inquiry" that
the trustee is acting within his authority and, therefore, they
cannot be liable for executing his instructions. Plaintiff cannot
show defendants had "actual knowledge" of any breach of trust.
Defendants' duty was to obey the trustee's instructions.
Plaintiff's only claim is that, had they studied the Norman
Anderson Trust Agreement, defendants would have reached the legal
conclusion that the Agreement did not authorize the trustee to
order the transfers.

The premise is not true.

Even if it were

true, constructive knowledge is not the same as actual knowledge,
and it is the latter which is required.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

PLAINTIFF AS A TRUST BENEFICIARY LACKS STANDING.
Trusts act through trustees, not beneficiaries.

Trustees' acts and omissions bind trusts and subject them to
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limitations defenses.

Claims to recover trust assets ordinarily

belong to trustees. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 281 (set
forth in Addendum D).

The Court of Appeals in Anderson v. Dean

Witter Reynolds. Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah App. 1992) cited a
limited exception to the general rule:
[T]he beneficiary has the right to bring an action
against a third party when the beneficiary's interests
are hostile to those of the trustee.
The Court cited Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 282(2) (set
forth in Addendum E) giving a beneficiary standing to sue the
third party and the trustee in equity if the trustee "improperly
refuses or neglects" to sue.

It held, for the Rule 12(b) (6)

motion to dismiss before it, that ". . . it is clear from the
complaint the beneficiary could prove facts showing she had
standing. . ." Xd. at 745. This case is past the pleading stage.
Now, after completion of discovery, plaintiff's certification of
readiness for trial and both sides1 motions for summary judgment,
the record shows conclusively that plaintiff cannot prove facts
showing she has standing; it shows conclusively no hostility
existed between plaintiff and James. Hence, the exception does
not apply, and plaintiff's suit was correctly dismissed for lack
of standing.
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Any hostility between James as trustee and his mother
as beneficiary would arise only if it were true that James
neglected to bring suit against Dean Witter because he knew his
transfer instructions were improper and he hesitated to impugn
his own conduct.

In fact, however, both James and plaintiff have

insisted James did not know he did anything wrong and that he did
nothing wrong.

James' Affidavit ( H 5-6) declared he was

"unaware that the transfer violated the specific terms of the
Norman Anderson Trust."

(R. 2239.)

Anna testified James did not

know it was wrong to take the money and that she is not pointing
any fingers at him.

Facts 1 29.

hostility; it negates it.

That does not establish

£££. Velez V, Feinstein# 87 A.D.2d 309,

451 N.Y.S.2d 110, 115 (1982).
Moreover, the record shows not that James hesitated to
act for the Trust, but that he was willing to take whatever
action was necessary to recover Trust assets.

When James1

attorney belatedly thought in 1990 that the Norman Anderson Trust
might have a claim, James immediately sought to pursue it at the
inception of the arbitration hearing.

Facts %% 30-32.

When

their effort was denied for untimeliness by the arbitrators, the
trustee's attorney within two days filed this lawsuit in the name
of the beneficiary while he continued to assert the trustee's
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claims in arbitration.

Their use of the same attorney belies any

claim of hostility or conflict of interest between this mother
and this son.

Plaintiff has failed to meet the opportunity

previously given by this Court to "prove facts showing she has
standing" to recover trust assets.7
Plaintiff's Brief (at 40) cites § 282(2) of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts.

It does not help her. First,

plaintiff has not sued the trustee.8

Second, this is an action

at law for damages, not a suit in equity as required.

Third, she

has not established in the record that the trustee did anything
"improper."

She says, "[t]he only inquiry relevant" to standing

is whether the trustee neglected to sue for ten years.
(Plaintiff's Brief at 39; emphasis hers.)

She rests solely on

the lapse of time, making no effort to demonstrate the existence
of a genuine issue of fact that the trustee "improperly
neglected" to sue by showing that his conduct amounted to
hostility toward her.

Her simplistic reading of this Court's

7

Plaintiff's Brief (at 40) relies on § 327 of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts as authority for standing, but that section deals with limitations
and laches, not standing.
8

Restatement (Second) of Trusts, comment e on subsection 2 of § 282
(quoted in addendum E), makes it clear the beneficiary's suit in equity is
"against the trustee to compel him to perform his duty" and in such suit, a
third party may be joined.
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prior decision would destroy the limitations defense; under her
reading, limitations could never run against beneficiaries'
claims.
said.

Hostility is required, as this Court's prior decision

Id. at 745.

is no hostility.

The record demonstrates affirmatively there

Now, past pleading, after extensive discovery

and on the eve of trial, in the face of defendants' showing,
plaintiff cannot point to any facts in the record to make an
issue of standing.

The trial court correctly denied her motion

for summary judgment and granted defendants' motion.
POINT II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN AGAINST THE TRUSTEE

AND THE BENEFICIARY ON ALL CAUSES QF ACTIONA.

Limitations Have Run Against The Trustee.

Generally, limitations begins to run on the happening
of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.
United Park City Mines v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880,
890 (Utah 1993) . Here, the claim is that defendants should not
have transferred assets out of the Norman Anderson Trust account.
Each cause of action was complete when the transfer occurred in
1980.

The statutes of limitations for claims on breach of

contract9 and for interference with contract, negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty10 all expired on April 22, 1984.

9

10

Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 78-12-25(1).
Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 78-12-25(3).
11
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This

suit was not brought until December, 1990. All causes of action
are barred.
James knew the assets of Norman's Trust account were
transferred in 1980 out of it and into Anna Lee's Trust account
and his personal account.

He knew they were not transferred into

non-existent accounts denominated "Norman Anderson Family Trust"
and "Norman Anderson Family Trust."

(R. 1866-7.)

He received

and reviewed monthly statements showing precisely the names of
the accounts to which the assets were transferred and he raised
no objection. (Facts % 21).

The assets, therefore, were

transferred precisely as the trustee had intended; Dean Witter
made no mistake.
As trustee, James had available to him all of the
information and documents necessary to determine whether the
Norman Trust instrument permitted transfers out of it. He also
consulted a host of professional advisors, all of whom had copies
of, and all of whose work depended on a review of, the Norman
Trust agreement and Dean Witter's monthly statements.

Because

James knew all relevant facts pertaining to the 1980 transfers
and is bound to have known the consequences, limitations started
running against him as trustee on April 22, 1980 and he would be
barred if he sued on plaintiff's claims.
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B.

The Beneficiary Did Not Establish Any Of The Three
Elements For An Exception To The Bar Of

Limitations!
Where, as here, the statute of limitations bars suit by
the trustee against a third party, the beneficiary is barred,
too.

Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 327(1) z11 see Interfirst

Bank-Houston. N.A. v. Quintana Petroleum Corp.. 699 S.W.2d 864,
874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985).

The Restatement provides an exception

to this rule only if the beneficiary can establish:

(1) the

trustee knowingly breached the trust, (2) the third party
knowingly participated in the breach, and (3) the beneficiary is
not barred by laches.

Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 327(2).

Plaintiff fails all three tests.
a.

The Trustee Did Not Knowingly Breach The

To fit within the exception, the beneficiary first must
show that the trustee himself knowingly breached the trust.
But upon reason and authority where (the third party
transferee) and the trustee had no actual knowledge of
the breach, and acted innocently, though illegally, the
statute of limitations runs against the trustee and if
barred as to him also bars the cestui que trust. The
text finds support in the cited authorities as well, we
think also in sound reasoning.

See Addendum F.
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA

Spann v. First Nat'1 Bank of Montgomery. 240 Ala. 539, 200 So.
554, 558 (1941).

James has sworn voluntarily in his affidavit

that he did not believe, and had no knowledge until 1990, that
his instructions to transfer the assets violated the Norman
Trust. (R. 2239, H 5-6.)
b.

Defendants Did Not Have Actual Knowledge The

Trustee Breached His Trust.
Under § 327(2) of the Restatement, a beneficiary must
also prove that the third party knowingly participated with the
trustee in the breach; that means actual knowledge of the breach.
It is not enough the third party "could have" known or even
"should have" known of the breach.
Corp.

Adler v. Manor Health Care

7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1116, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732, 735

(1992).
In Jones v. Idaho. 91 Idaho 823, 432 P.2d 420 (1967), a
mother held real property in trust but sold it in breach of trust
terms.

A successor trustee and the beneficiaries sued the

buyers, who pleaded limitations.

The beneficiaries claimed the

buyers had notice of the terms of the trust because it had been
recorded.

The Court rejected the constructive notice argument:
The fact, however, that he had such notice did not
prevent the statute of limitations from running. If
that were so, the statute would cease to be one of

30
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repose. The statute will run in favor of even a
wrongdoer.
Id. at 426.

See al££ Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ross. 781

F. Supp. 415, 418-19 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (liability of third party
for knowing participation in breach of duty by ERISA fiduciary
must be based on knowledge at the time of the transaction that it
amounted to a breach of trust).
Here, as detailed below in Point III, it is undisputed
that neither Dean Witter nor Pahnke had actual knowledge James
was committing a breach of trust -- if in fact he did -- merely
by executing James' instructions to transfer the assets.
Plaintiff argues that, because James had provided Dean Witter
with a complete copy of the Trust instrument when he opened the
Norman Trust account in 1978, defendants could, or even should,
have known the 1980 transfers were improper.

But, as Jones

teaches, constructive notice is not "knowing participation."
c.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred by Laches.

Plaintiff also fails the third element of the
Restatement's exception because she is guilty of laches.

As one

leading authority explained,
A beneficiary cannot sit idly by and close his eyes to
what is going on around him. "One who would repel the
imputation of laches on the score of ignorance of his
rights must be without fault in remaining so long in
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ignorance of those rights. Indolent ignorance and
indifference will no more avail than will voluntary
ignorance of one's rights." As a Pennsylvania court
has said: "Laches is not excused by simply saying: 'I
did not know.' If by diligence a fact can be
ascertained the want of knowledge so caused is no
excuse for a stale claim. The test is not what the
plaintiff knows, 'but what he might have known, by the
use of the means of information within his reach, with
the vigilance the law requires of him.111
G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees. § 949 at 531 (rev. 2d ed. 1982).
The elements of laches are (1) claimant's lack of diligence, and
(2) resulting injury to defendant.

Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah

Division of State Lands, 802 p.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990).
Plaintiff admits she believed her "nest egg" in the
Norman Trust should not have been touched.

(R. 1856.)

It is

likewise undisputed that by June 1984 she knew that all of those
assets had been transferred out of that trust when she was told
they had been liquidated to repay James' loans.

Facts 11 47-49.

She need not be aware of all details to put her on inquiry
notice .12
u

Warren v. Provo Citv. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992), United Park
City Mines v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 890 (Utah 1993)("sufficient
knowledge to put them on inquiry"); O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821
P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) ("threshold showing that he or she did not know
and could not reasonably have known"); Leggroan v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Co.. 120 Utah 93, 101-02, 232 P.2d 746, 750 (1951) (facts "should have lead
the cestuis as reasonable men to think that the trust estate was almost entirely

gone"),- Hackforfl Yi First Security Bank, 521 F. supp. 541, 559-60 & n.22 (D.
Utah 1981) (notice charged when facts are available), aff'd. No. 81-1863,
unpublished slip, op., 1983 WL 20180 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 464 U.S. 827

(continued...)
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K n o w l e d g e that the

"untouchable" had b e e n

completely

taken put her on duty to exercise reasonable d i l i g e n c e to ask
"why?" and

"how?"

One fully informed of such facts as w o u l d put

a p e r s o n of o r d i n a r y intelligence and p r u d e n c e on inquiry but w h o
m a k e s no inquiry

"is deemed to have discovered all that w o u l d

have b e e n revealed.
P.2d

1 1 8 2 , 1185

..."

(Utah

Koulis v. Standard Oil of Calif..

1987).

D e s p i t e having access to a host of legal and
a d v i s o r s , plaintiff asked no one w h y the a s s e t s , w h i c h
insists w e r e

746

"untouchable," were taken.

accounting
she

Plaintiff simply has no

excuse for the six-year delay b e t w e e n learning the a s s e t s w e r e
gone and filing suit.

It is her b u r d e n to show she took

r e a s o n a b l e steps to investigate.
Services.

821 P.2d

1139, 1144

O'Neal v. D i v i s i o n of

(Utah 1 9 9 1 ) .

no steps at a l l . Plaintiff's Brief

Family

She admits she

took

(at 46) argues that the "one,

single p i e c e of information" the p r o f e s s i o n a l s and plaintiff
lacked to "unlock the mystery" of J a m e s ' b r e a c h of trust w a s the
1980 letter of a u t h o r i z a t i o n .

There w a s no "mystery" about it.

The subsequent m o n t h l y account statements showed the

l2

executed

(... continued)
(1983); Bayou Bend Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Manhattan Construction Co.,
866 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1993) ("All that is required to commence
the running of the limitations period is the discovery of an injury and its
general cause, not the exact cause in fact and the specific parties responsible.")
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transfers from the Norman Trust account into the Anna Lee trust
account and into James' personal account and so must have their
tax returns.

Facts % 31. Plaintiff admits:

"[The accountants]

had access to [Dean Witter] account statements. . . They
understood the distribution provisions in the Norman Anderson
Trust."

(Plaintiff's Brief at 46.)

Far from being "the key,"

the letter of authorization was unnecessary to her "discovery."
Given her now claimed conviction that her "nest egg" was
"untouchable," she only had to know one new thing to alert her in
1984 to investigate:
was gone.

that the stock in Norman's Trust account

It mattered not to whom, why or how it was gone.

knew it should not have been touched.

She

It was she, however, who

kept her now claimed conviction to herself and did not reveal it
to others, including the professionals.
that was "the key."

It was her conviction

Reading in 1990 the April, 1980 letter of

authorization would have revealed nary a single new fact not
fully reported by Dean Witter's 1980 monthly statements.
Plaintiff's lack of diligence has severely damaged and
prejudiced Dean Witter.

Important documents have been lost and

memories of key witnesses have faded since the transactions
occurred in 1980, precluding explanation of how they were made
and what understanding the Andersons and their professionals had
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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of them.

Did p l a i n t i f f approve, condone or r a t i f y the transfers?

James has forgotten important meetings with a l l of the various
attorneys and accountants.

None of them can remember any of the

conversations they had with James, though t h e i r notes and
documents show they occurred.

See Facts ff 26.

Lost papers include the 1980 Norman Anderson Family
Trust income tax return prepared by Teresa Scott (which successor
accountant Mel Christofferson's notes r e f l e c t he reviewed in 1985
(R. 1999)) and the annual balance sheets Teresa Scott says she
prepared "as a normal course" along with tax returns for t r u s t
clients.

(R. 2186-7.)
At t h i s l a t e date, there i s no longer any way to

determine the extent these professionals discussed with James the
l e g a l , administrative or p r a c t i c a l considerations which led James
to d i r e c t the t r a n s f e r s and what Anna Lee knew or could see about
his conduct. 13

Other destroyed documents s i g n i f i c a n t t o show who knew about and
approved of t h e t r a n s f e r include Dean W i t t e r ' s w i r e s , order t i c k e t s , margin
t i c k e t s and o t h e r r e l e v a n t memoranda. Witnesses with l i t t l e or dimmed memory
on the s u b j e c t include James Anderson, Anna Lee Anderson, S t u a r t Matheson,
Dean Gray, t a x a d v i s e r Kent Demars, accountant Teresa S c o t t , of Webb, Anderson
& Co. Facts 11 23, 63. For l a c h e s , one need not show the testimony of
w i t n e s s e s with dimmed memory would have been f a v o r a b l e . Gerhard v. Stephens.
442 P.2d 692 (S.C. Cal. 1968), n. 44.
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d.

Plaintiff's Excuses Fail.

Plaintiff's Brief (at 20) argues her claims were
concealed from her by defendants, but she points to no fact that
was concealed nor to any misleading statement by defendants.

The

concealment she claims was that defendants did not disclose the
dubious legal conclusion that a breach of trust had occurred.
How could they?

James and defendants did not know of any breach

or that such claim would be made.
does not know.

One cannot conceal what one

Dean Witter's monthly statements disclosed every

single relevant material fact concerning its activities on these
accounts.

Dean Witter's duty was to disclose facts to its

customer, James Anderson as trustee and for himself, and it did
just that.
Plaintiff's Brief (at 41) claims limitations do not run
until plaintiff learns or should learn the facts giving rise to
the action, citing Klinger v. Knightly. 792 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah
1990).

Plaintiff's reliance is misplaced.

In the first place,

the issue here is whether plaintiff has shown diligence in
pursuit of facts to prove she is not barred by laches to avoid
the trustee's bar of limitations; it is not when did limitations
begin to run.

Second, Klinger makes it clear the discovery rule

is an exception to the normal application of the statute of
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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limitations.
here.

The "discovery rule" exception could not apply

Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86, (Utah 1981) notes the

"governing policy" is that statutes of limitations
. . . are designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared.
It teaches that mere ignorance of a cause of action does not
prevent the running of limitations.

Plaintiff presents no facts

or argument, as in Klinger dealing with discovery of an improper
survey, to establish that this is an exceptional situation where
application of those general rules would be unjust.

She cannot

do it, given Dean Witter's accurate monthly statements reporting
all facts and her six year old knowledge of loss.
Plaintiff argues (her Brief at 21) that as a
beneficiary her duty of inquiry was limited.

The point is

irrelevant here: she is barred because the trustee is barred,
unless she establishes the three elements of the Restatementfs
exception, one of which is her diligent inquiry.

Moreover, she

failed as a matter of law to exercise any diligence.

See Andress

v. Condos. 672 S.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (the
existence of a fiduciary relationship does not eliminate the
requirement of reasonable diligence; limitations runs from date
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of inquiry notice; and summary judgment on limitations can be
appropriate as a matter of law).
Plaintiff's sole case cited for an excuse (her Brief at

21) is Eisenbaum v. western Energy Resources, Inc./ 218 cal. App.
3d 314, 267 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1990).

There, the seller of a limited

partnership interest lied in writing to the buyer, representing
the transaction was legal.

The court held limitations did not

begin to run until the buyer consulted his attorney, but that was
because the only fact which could have been discovered about the
representation was that the legal conclusion expressly given was
incorrect.
advanced:

Eisenbaum does not stand for the proposition
a beneficiary need not sue until told by counsel she

has a claim.

Here, plaintiff cannot prove defendants

misrepresented or concealed any fact.
The statute of limitations began to run against the
trustee on April 22, 1980, and expired four years later.
Plaintiff has failed to establish any of the three elements
extending limitations for a beneficiary under Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, § 327(2), so her claims, too, were barred on
April 22, 1984, as a matter of law.
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POINT III.

DEAN WITTER AND RALPH PAHNKE DID NOT BREACH ANY
DITTY RY EXECUTING JAMES' INSTRUCTIONS TO TRANSFER
THE TRUST ASSETS.

Plaintiff's Brief (at 25) admits "this case turns on
the propriety of a single, isolated transaction in April, 1980."
Defendants agree.

If that transfer were wrongful, plaintiff

would have a claim against James for breach of trust.

But it

certainly does not follow she also has a claim against Dean
Witter and Pahnke.

A stockbroker's duty is to obey the

customer's instructions -- exactly as Dean Witter and Pahnke did
here.

(R. 2144-5).

To hold Dean Witter and Pahnke legally

responsible for the allegedly wrongful transfer, plaintiff must
establish the reverse of the usual rule:

i.e.. that Dean Witter

and Pahnke had the duty not to follow their customer's
instructions.

This she cannot do.

Section 7 of the Utah Uniform Trustee's Powers Act
(Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406 (1953)) provides:
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee
or assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction,
the existence of trust power and their proper exercise
by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The
third person is not bound to inquire whether the
trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the
power; and a third person, without actual knowledge
that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the
trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly
exercised the powers he purports to exercise. A third
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA
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person is not bound to assure the proper application of
trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee.
That was taken verbatim from § 7 of the Uniform Trustees' Powers
Act.

It was enacted to protect third parties in their dealings

with trustees.

Horowitz, Uniform Trustee's Powers Act. 41:1

Wash. L. Rev. 1, 4 and 28 (1966). At common law, third parties
who dealt with a trustee were bound to inquire into the
limitations of a trustee's powers.

If they failed to inquire,

they were charged with constructive knowledge of the information
they might reasonably have discovered.

This potential exposure

made third parties justifiably reluctant to deal with a trustee
for fear the trustee might exceed trust powers.

To remove those

fears and to promote dealings with trustees, the Uniform Law
Commission adopted § 7 of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act.
at 1.

Xd.

It affords protection to third parties by expressly saying

they are not to be charged with constructive knowledge of
limitations on the power of a trustee; they lose that protection
only if they have actual knowledge of a trust breach by the
trustee.14

Its purpose is noted by a leading treatise on trusts:
In dealing with this question of liability for taking
part in a transfer of securities, the legislatures have

14

Plaintiff concedes the statute "immunizes third persons from a 'duty
of inquiry.'"
(Her brief at 31).
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adopted the arguments made by corporations and their
transfer agents and other interested businessmen that
it is unreasonable to put a duty of inquiry on the
intermediary who effects the transfer, since he is not
paid for an investigating service and to require it of
him would be burdensome, time-consuming and expensive.
G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees. § 905, at 308-09 (rev. 2d ed.

1982).

Thus, as a matter of law, Dean Witter and Pahnke were
entitled to "assume" James was acting within his authority in
giving his instructions.

They had no. duty to determine

whether in fact the trust instrument gave him that authority.
Under § 75-7-406, they were "fully protected" in following James'
instructions unless they had "actual knowledge" he was not
properly exercising his authority.
evidence of actual knowledge.

The record is barren of any

To prove actual knowledge,

plaintiff must establish defendants (1) read the distribution
terms of the trust and (2) actually formed the conscious
conclusion that the April 1980 transfers violated the trust.

The

record affirmatively shows lack of such knowledge.
Every single witness, whether party, employee or
professional, has testified he or she did not know James
improperly exercised his powers.

Plaintiff has offered no

evidence to contradict them; she has not offered any witness to
testify there was a breach of the Trust.
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Indeed the

uncontradicted record establishes that Dean Witter, through Ralph
Pahnke or Kathy Barnett, did not know of a breach of trust.

The

uncontradicted record establishes that it is not known which Dean
Witter margin clerks handled the 1980 transaction because those
records now are gone (Facts 1 17), but industry practice shows
they certainly would not have considered the propriety of the
trustee's directions.

(Facts % 19.)

Being unable to offer any evidence of actual knowledge,
plaintiff argues that Dean Witter and Pahnke could, or should,
have known that the transfers violated the Trust merely because
the Trust instrument had been delivered to Dean Witter a year and
a half earlier.
known.

No witness testified Dean Witter should have

Plaintiff's argument of a breach fails for two reasons:

first, the premise is not correct, and, second, constructive
knowledge is not enough.
The uncontradicted testimony of experts shows that
anyone reading the distribution provisions of the trust
instrument would not invariably conclude it prohibited the
transfers.

Trust expert Dean Edward Spurgeon15 opined that one

15

Dean Spurgeon's credentials include J.D. Stanford, 1964; Masters
Degree in Taxation, N.Y.U., 1968; 1968-1980, partner in Los Angeles with Paul
Hastings Janofsky & Walker; Professor of Law, University of Utah, 1983-1990,
and Dean; now Professor of Law and Dean of Law School, University of Georgia.

(continued...)
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reading Norman's Trust Agreement and the letter of authorization
would not necessarily have known the transfers violated the
dispositive provisions of the Trust.

(R. 2198.)

He explained

that the beneficiary could have requested the trustee to make "a
distribution of any or all of those (marital) assets to herself
or someone else, and "that can be done."

(R. 22 03.)

He

testified it is the practice of some trustees to carry title to
trust assets in their own name.

(R. 2204.)

Stockbroker

compliance expert Joan Lavell (R. 2024) testified that even as to
known trust assets, "there is no way for a brokerage firm to
define what a trustee is doing other than to follow the trustee's
instructions," so that a trustee may hold the trust assets in any
name he chooses, "and to commingle" them.

"If [a known trust]

account was established in the name of an individual, [the
broker] would treat it as it would any other individual account."
(R. 2014:17-19; 2015:19-25.)
Actual experience buttresses those opinions.
lawyer

James'

(Stuart Matheson) and three C.P.A. firms (Coopers &

Lybrand; Bill Anderson and Teresa Scott; and Greg and Mel

15

(...continued)

He is experienced with the brokerage industry as a lawyer representing
investors and personal account holders; he is a specialist in estate and trust
administration; and, he is a lawyer for fiduciaries. (R. 2189-93).
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Christofferson) each used Norman's Trust instrument and
defendants' monthly account statements to render professional
services about distribution of the Trust assets; yet none of them
ever raised any notion that the transfers violated the trust.
(Plaintiff's Brief at 46). If they did not know the assets
should not have been transferred out of Norman's Trust, why then
should defendants be charged with knowledge that such was a
breach when they did not even read the distribution provisions of
the Trust?
Second and more important, under § 75-7-406 even if
defendants could be charged with knowledge, constructive
knowledge is insufficient to subject them to liability.

As one

commentator put it,
It is to be noted that constructive knowledge, as
distinguished from actual knowledge, is not enough.
Therefore, mere suspicion that limitations exist or
knowledge of facts which, if pursued, would show that
limitations exist do not deprive a third person of this
protection.
Horowitz, supra at 28-29; See al££ Richards v. Platter Valley
Bank, 866 F.2d 1576 (10th Cir. 1989) (reversing judgment against
bank because the verdict was based on "actual notice" rather than
"actual knowledge" as required under the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act); Sontag v. Stix. 199 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1947) (requiring actual
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knowledge); Scott on Trusts. § 326.5 at 314-5 (4th ed. 1989)
(actual knowledge, and not j u s t circumstances that would put the
t h i r d party on notice, must be proven). 16
P l a i n t i f f thus f a i l s to r a i s e a t r i a b l e issue
sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

See J e t t v. Sunderman,

840 F.2d 1487, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988) (summary judgment proper in
aiding and abetting case because defendants submitted
declarations s t a t i n g they did not have knowledge of primary
v i o l a t i o n and p l a i n t i f f ' s declarations failed to r a i s e any
genuine issue as to that f a c t ) .
Given that p l a i n t i f f has failed to e s t a b l i s h that the
1980 t r a n s f e r s to the e x i s t i n g Anna lee t r u s t and James1 personal
margin accounts were a c t u a l l y known by defendants to breach
Norman's Trust Agreement, the issue of margining in the Norman
Anderson Trust i s i r r e l e v a n t .

P l a i n t i f f complains about the

t r a n s f e r s out of Norman's Trust, not margining in the transferee

To p r e v a i l on such a theory, the b e n e f i c i a r y must show t h a t , i n
a d d i t i o n t o having a c t u a l knowledge, the t h i r d p a r t y was a c t i n g t o f u r t h e r i t s
own p r i v a t e f i n a n c i a l gain r a t h e r than t o serve the i n t e r e s t s of i t s c l i e n t ,
the t r u s t e e . See P i e r c e v. Lyman. 1 Cal. App. 4th 1095 (1991). Dean W i t t e r
earned normal commissions on the stock purchases and s a l e s ordered by James.
Nothing was earned on the May 8, 1980, t r a n s f e r s . See Monthly Statement for
May 1980 (R. 1802-3). But the r e c e i p t of fees for p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s does
not c o n s t i t u t e the kind of p e r s o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e d t o render a
t h i r d p a r t y l i a b l e for p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a n o t h e r ' s breach of t r u s t .
See
Skarbrevik v. Cohen. England & Whitfield. 231 Cal. App. 3d 692, 710 (1991).
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accounts.

Her claim is the same whether James sold the stock and

took the cash out or whether he took the cash out by borrowing
against the assets.
Furthermore, plaintiff has not established that those
assets could not be margined or that to do so breached any
industry standard of practice.

All experts have testified to the

contrary. Defendants' internal policies -- issued to guide clerks
-- prove nothing.

The internal policy "exceeds industry

standards" and margin borrowing in Norman's Trust was
permissible, expert Lavel testified.

(R. 2018-9.)

The margin

borrowings from the Norman Anderson Trust account were limited to
$40,000 (R. 1784) and $35,000 (R. 1786) on May 29 and June 8,
1979 respectively, after James signed a margin agreement for the
Norman Anderson Trust account on May 29, 1979.

(R. 1812A17.)

Neither is there any showing that defendants formed a
conclusion that to permit margining was a breach of the Norman
Trust agreement; trustee power to borrow is statutorily given in
Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(3)(s).

The great bulk of

the margining was from the Anna Lee Trust's and James' accounts,
which plaintiff does not claim to have been improper.

17

This sheet was not paginated.
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Spurgeon testified that even if a firm is aware a trust document
does not expressly authorize the trustee to margin assets, it
does not have to require the trust be amended to show specific
authority to borrow because the trustee still may have implied
power to margin the assets.

A trustee has those implied

statutory powers as may be necessary in his judgment to act as a
prudent man, so if the trustee in good faith thought it prudent
to margin assets, then the trustee would have the power to do so.
(R. 2195-6.)

Paragraph (1) of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act

mirrors in Utah the prudent man rule of practice enunciated by
Dean Spurgeon.
Without citing any applicable authority plaintiff's
Brief (at 32) claims "actual knowledge" is an affirmative defense
defendants must disprove.

That is patently wrong.

The Uniform

Trustees' Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406, establishes that
proper exercise of a trustee's power may be "assumed without
inquiry" absent "actual knowledge" to the contrary.

This change

in common law was made because "[w]ithout this section, third
persons might never safely deal with a trustee for fear that he
was exceeding his trust powers under the prudent man rule."
Horowitz, supra at 28.

Plaintiff's proposition is that unless

the third party proves lack of actual knowledge, actual knowledge
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will be imputed.

That oxymoron is precisely the opposite result

the Uniform Act intends; gone would be the "assumption without
inquiry" rule enacted to speed up commerce.

The statute

establishes the scope of the duty third parties gave to trustees;
since showing a breach of duty is always part of plaintiff!s
case, plaintiff has the bruden to prove all elements of breach,
including "actual knowledge".

see Commercial Savings Bank v,

Baum. 137 Colo. 538, 327 P.2d 743, 745 (1958) (under the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, "The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish actual knowledge and bad faith.")

That the defendant

in Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 732 (1992), like defendants here, made a record showing
of no actual knowledge does not mean they had the burden to do
so, as plaintiff's Brief (at 35) implies; to the contrary,
plaintiff in Adler alleged defendant had "actual or constructive
knowledge" trust powers had been exceeded, but failed to prove
actual knowledge as required.
CONCLUSION
Dean Witter had no duty to and was not paid to
investigate, to cross examine, nor to weigh the propriety of the
transfers, the loans, or the trustee's power to make them.
Defendants did not receive a dime for making the transfers.
48
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Defendants were not James' lawyer, accountant, or estate planner;
they were stockbrokers, and they did only what stockbrokers are
expected to do.
How ironic it is that plaintiff blames Ralph Pahnke, a
pure order taker for the transfers in 1980 and for each loan.

He

simply relayed the customer's instructions to Dean Witter's San
Francisco regional office.
Notice how no blame is placed on James, who received
large amounts of the family assets.

James had independent legal

and accounting advice, completely unrelated to Dean Witter, about
different options for dealing with the trusts, making loans from
the trusts, and filing tax returns for the trusts.

If her son

did nothing wrong, as plaintiff says, then no one did anything
wrong.

But if the transfers in fact violated the terms of the

Norman Trust, then James and the Anna Lee Trust improperly
received distributions of Trust assets, have been unjustly
enriched, and it is they to whom plaintiff must look for return
of the assets.
Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue the action
because she cannot prove hostility between her as beneficiary and
James as trustee.

Moreover, her complaint is barred by

limitations because the statute began to run when the transfers
49
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were made in 1980 and suit was not filed until 1990.

Since the

record shows neither the trustee nor Dean Witter had actual
knowledge of a breach of trust, and since plaintiff herself is
guilty of laches, she cannot avail herself of the exception to
the limitations bar.
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke did not breach any duty by
following James' instructions to transfer the Norman Trust
assets.

They are entitled to the full protection of § 75-7-406

of the Utah Uniform Trustees' Powers Act.

Since neither

defendant had actual knowledge James was exceeding his authority
as trustee in making the transfers, they had no duty to secondguess his instructions and thus cannot be held liable for
"knowingly participating" with James in any breach of trust.
The trial court's granting of defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment dismissing the complaint should be affirmed.
DATED:

July 11, 1995.
MOYLE 8c DRAPER, P.C.

By
Joseph J. Palmer
Reid E. Lewis
Attorneys for Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph
Pahnke
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Jeffrey Swinton
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Suite 400
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402. Powers of trustees conferred by this
part.
(1) From time of creation of the trust until final
distribution of the assets of the trust, a trustee has the power
to perform, without court authorization, every act which a
prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust,
including the powers specified in Subsection (3).
(2) In the exercise of his powers, including the
powers granted by this part, a trustee has a duty to act with due
regard to his obligation as a fiduciary, according to the
standard set forth in Section 75-7-302.

(1) and

(3) A trustee has the power, subject to Subsections
(2) to:

(q) hold property in the name of a nominee or in other
form without disclosure of the trust so that title to the
property may pass by delivery, but the trustee is liable for
any act of the nominee in connection with the property so
held;

(s) (i)
otherwise;

(t)

borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or

(i)

pay or contest any claim;

(ii) settle a claim by or against the trust by
compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and
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0)

(x) effect distribution of property and money in
divided or undivided interests and adjust resulting
differences in valuation;

(z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, or
proceedings for the protection of trust assets and of the
trustee in the performance of his duties;
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(2)

ADDENDUM B

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406.
with trustee.

Third persons protected in dealing

With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee
or assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the
existence of trust power and their proper exercise by the trustee
may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is not bound to
inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is properly
exercising the power; and a third person, without actual
knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee
as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he
purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to assure the
proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to the
trustee.
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(3)

ADDENDUM C

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-408.

Uniformity of interpretation.

This part shall be construed to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act.
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(4)

ADDENDUM D

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 281.
Beneficiary.

Action at Law by

(1) Where the trustee could maintain an action at law
or suit in equity or other proceeding against a third person if
the trustee held the trust property free of trust, the
beneficiary cannot maintain an action at law against the third
person, [subject to an inapplicable exception in subparagraph
(2)] .

Comment on Subsection (1):
(a) The interest of the beneficiary of a trust is an
equitable interest, and ordinarily is protected by suits in
equity rather than by actions at law. This is true not only of
the remedy of the beneficiary against the trustee (see § 197),
but also of the remedy of the beneficiary against a third person.
As to suits in equity by the beneficiary against a third person,
see § 282.
(b) Tort claims. If a third person commits a tort with
respect to the trust property, the beneficiary, if he is not in
possession, cannot maintain an action at law against him. . .
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(5)

ADDENDUM E

Restatement (Second of Trusts) § 282.
Beneficiary,

Suit in Equity by

(1) Where the trustee could maintain an action at law
or suit in equity or other proceeding against a third person if
the trustee held the property free of trust, the beneficiary
cannot maintain a suit in equity against the third person, except
as stated in Subsections (2) and (3).
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or neglects to
bring an action against the third person, the beneficiary can
maintain a suit in equity against the trustee and the third
person.

Comment on Subsection (1):
a. Ordinarily the interest of the beneficiary is protected
against third persons acting adversely to the trustee through
proceedings brought against them by the trustee and not by the
beneficiary. As long as the trustee is ready and willing to take
the proper proceedings against such third persons, the
beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in equity against them.
b. Tort claims. If a third person commits a tort with
respect to the trust property, the beneficiary cannot maintain a
suit in equity against him, except under the circumstances stated
in Subsections (2) and (3). Thus, if land is held in trust and a
third person wrongfully enters upon or damages the land, or if
chattels are held in trust and a third person wrongfully takes
them away or damages them, the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit
in equity against him.
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(6)

Comment on Subsection (2):
e.
Where the trustee fails to sue. If the trustee fails
to perform his duty to bring an action at law or suit in equity
or other proceeding against a third person (see § 177), the
beneficiary can maintain a suit in equity against the trustee to
compel him to perform his duty. In order to settle the
controversy in a single suit and avoid multiplicity of suits, the
beneficiary can join the third person with the trustee as codefendants, and the matter will be disposed of in a single suit.
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(7)

ADDENDUM F

Restatement (Second of Trusts) § 327. Rights of Beneficiary When
Trustee Barred by the Statute of Limitations or Laches.

(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if the trustee
is barred by the Statute of Limitations or by laches from
maintaining an action against a third person with respect to the
trust property, the beneficiary is precluded from maintaining an
action against the third person.
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from
maintaining an action against him therefor, unless
(a)

the beneficiary is himself guilty of laches, or

C:\WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\ADDENDUM.ANA
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